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Reagan’s Bluffing in the Cold
War Game Helped Him End
the Soviet Threat
Richard A. Contreras
Abstract
The Cold War between Russia and the United
States neared its end when President Ronald
Reagan took
office in January of 1981. A
worldwide policy of détente had been in effect
over the previous decade which allowed the
USSR to build up its arsenal of nuclear
weapons. Reagan was determined to reverse
this course, and by his derailing of détente and
style of tough rhetoric, the Soviet government
and newly-elected leader Mikhail Gorbachev
had no choice but to give into Reagan’s
capitulations. The U. S. leader’s bluff helped him
to end the Cold War and nuclear threat— that

communist regime would indeed fall and
usher in a new wave of democratic
governments worldwide.
Keywords: Reagan, Cold War, détente,
Gorbachev, communism, Star Wars, SDI,
Russia, nuclear weapons
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The Cold War between the Soviet
Republic and the United States had been brewing
for nearly four decades when Ronald Reagan, the
40th president of the U.S. took office in January
1981. During the late 1960’s and 1970’s and with
the advent of détente as orchestrated by President
Richard Nixon, there had been a cooling off of
hostilities between the two countries and an
increase on diplomatic, economic, and cultural
communication and understanding between the
two world superpowers. Reagan, however, did
not believe in the philosophy of his fellow
republican leader. Instead of utilizing Nixon’s
strategy of discussion and embargoes, the socalled “Great Communicator” believed in turning
up the heat and —by utilizing a game-playing
strategy— Reagan’s bluffing in the Cold War
game helped him to stand up to the Soviet
challenge.
Mandelbaum and Talbott surveyed the
dark clouds on the horizon from the Russians’
point of view when Reagan entered the arena:
The fortunes of the Soviet Union
had fallen. Reagan’s postwar
predecessors
had
all
been
committed to trying to tame the
Russian bear; he was prepared to
kick it. This was bad enough for the
Soviet leadership. What made
matters worse from the Soviet
perspective was that Reagan was
trying to kick them while they were
down (10).
By forming his decisions based on a
“new” self-imposed style of détente, the president
was able to use rhetoric, scare tactics, war games,
and a decisive military and nuclear arsenal
buildup to sway the U.S.S.R. into capitulating to
eventual U.S. demands; He was able to persuade
the Soviet leadership into agreeing to and signing
multiple disarmament and reduction treaties.
Consequently, in the late 1980’s the threat of
worldwide nuclear annihilation was virtually
frozen. Rapidly propelled by the fall of the Berlin
Wall in late 1989, the Soviet Union regime would
crumble in ashes in 1991— and this also took
most of Eastern European bloc Communism
along with it, but not before tough talk and
weighty action behind the bluff message forced
the Russians’ hands.
President Reagan was helped by

governmental disarray and near collapse of the
Soviet political machine early in his first term as
U.S. leader. De-facto figureheads had all but
given way to an inner working of confusion at the
top of Russian leadership. Three successive heads
of state — Leonid Brezhnez, Yuri Andropov, and
Konstantin Chernenko— were sickly and in
effect not running the country while in office.
This task was in essence, given to a group of
others, thus diluting power and the force of the
resulting messages sent to the U.S. In a short span
during 1983-84, the three Russian premiers died
and the Soviets struggled to find a leader that
didn’t fit with the feeble and decrepit old guard of
ruling Russians. Since the old guard subscribed to
the newer appeasement strategy of détente, the
Soviets felt they had an upper hand in the cold
war battle.
Mandelbaum and Talbott noted that the
Soviets relished the standing and power that
cooperating with détente brought:
The Soviet side was more unified
and enthusiastic in its commitment
to the principles and practices of
détente. It formally recognized their
status as the international equal of
the United States. It meant that their
country was one of only two
members of the most exclusive club
in the world, the club of
superpowers, with all the attendant
rights and privileges (24).
The Russian position would eventually
change, and it became apparent when a new,
fresh, and young leader was chosen. In 1984
Mikhail Gorbachev, a 45-year-old relative
unknown to the outside world, suddenly took the
perch
of
the
superpower
leadership.
Notwithstanding, rapidly-changing events as
pertaining to the Soviet scheme of things had
placed the communistic country in a corner, at
least in Reagan’s mind.
The opportunistic approach the U.S.
president saw stemmed from events that had
occurred a few months before Gorbachev’s
appointment. As one of the men the eventual
leader replaced lay dying (Andropov), an
ongoing war game was being conducted not too
far from the outskirts of Soviet airspace. Russian
intelligence collection programs had been alerted
for a possible U.S. nuclear attack. In fact, so
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palpable was the hypersensitivity to war evident,
Soviet fighter jets shot down a Korean airliner in
Russian airspace in the summer of 1983. This led
to an increased buildup of nuclear war materiel
by the Reagan administration as well as the
aforementioned mock nuclear exercise.
The Soviet intelligence operative, known
as the KGB, had put a program in place to strain
out information of an imminent attack. The
program, known as RYAN, picked up chatter of
missile deployment and aiming of nuclear
warheads from nearby NATO-friendly European
countries. And even though these war games
were just that —games and not operational— the
fear it created within the Soviet machine was
highly effectual.
One historian (Fisher 30) observed how
an all-out war scare took place in Russia as a
result of the war game attack: “At various times
Russian strategists were acutely fearful. But those
fears, although at times extreme, were scarcely
insane”.
Seeing the resulting Soviet anxiety,
Reagan played another hand. He began one of the
most massive buildups of nuclear arsenal in U.S.
history. Defense Department spending for
developing, planning, and exercising additional
troops, along with their equipment and weaponry,
totaled approximately $54 billion in 1984.
Research for one of the resulting programs,
known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
ate chunks out of the government budget and sent
the U.S. deficit skyrocketing into the trillions.
Reagan, however, knew that at this stage
in the game, the spending of an astronomical
amount of money and decisive show of force was
essential before any diplomatic discussions could
begin with the new Soviet leader. Benjamin
Taylor in a front-page story reported the
president’s own words as the leader reiterated this
view: “The negotiations in Geneva won’t really
get down to the brass tacks until they see that we
are going forward with the scheduled deployment
of missiles in Europe” (1).
What was not known to many at the time
was that the SDI did not yet exist and was only in
developmental stages. In fact, it never came into
existence. However, at the time, talk of such a
system struck fear in the Soviet regime and
prompted a forced and rapid response in the
psychological game of war.

Ryavek describes the controversial
initiative: “The nature of the SDI is a layered
defense of radars, sensors, and laser or particle
beam weapons in orbit that could sense the
launching of missiles early on and destroy some
of them before they got into a position. The
Soviets are so concerned with it. A purely
defensive SDI would be something like a passive
force field of science fiction” (122).
The president also knew very well that
rhetoric and a war of words would be effective in
sending a message to the Soviet leadership. During
the war games scare of 1983, a popular movie was
screened in the U.S. to a widespread audience. The
film The Day After showed the devastating and
catastrophic effects of a nuclear attack in the
United States and Russia if the nations chose to use
such an option. The massive loss of life and a
portrayal of an end-of-the-world scenario played
out before millions in the U.S. household
audience. What worked even better, however, is
what the spook film did to the Russian leadership:
so frightened of the consequences of war, the
Soviets did not show the movie to the general
populace (Ryavek 105).
Reagan’s second term ushered in the rapid
changes of accord between the two nations now
that the groundwork of decisiveness, firmness and
rhetoric had been laid. The president would meet
with Secretary General Gorbachev four specific
times in face-to-face meetings to see if an
agreement on disarmament could be reached. Two
of the meetings were on neutral sites: Geneva,
Switzerland in 1985 and Reykjavic, Iceland in
1986; then the two sides met on the others’ home
turf: Washington in 1987 and Moscow the
following year. These meetings or “summits”
would be a key part of the decision points in
ending decades of hostility. It was important at
first for the two countries to meet neutrally, with
many of the other world economic along with the
leaders of the other nations— that, including the
U.S., compromised the G7 nations, or so-called
“Group of Seven”— could put added pressure on
Gorbachev to capitulate with U.S. demands.
The two superpower leaders had agreed in
principle; hence, two years later a ground-breaking
and historic compromise was reached: the
December 1987 signing of the INF Treaty at the
White House Rose Garden. Reagan, however, had
to use additional charm and subtleness to prod the
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Communist leader in the right direction— and this
was no easy task.
Gorbachev came into power seemingly
determined to rule in his own particular style yet
constantly battled with the old hard line stance of
Marxist-Leninist politics. He was in a conundrum
and appeared eager to appease both his constituent
communist populace as well as keep a wary eye on
the West. One of the first Soviet leaders to
encourage perestroika and glasnost (Russian
terms that mean demonstrating an openness to new
ways of living), the new Chairman instituted an
increasing exchange of ideas, culture, and arts with
the West. He encouraged citizens to expand their
horizons and was less concerned with the
contamination of the average Russian’s mind with
regards to western propaganda. A new way of
living was opening up in the aging Soviet bloc and
when the U.S. president spoke the rest of the
world, and most importantly, anti-democratic
regimes took note.
During the time of tough negotiation,
breakthroughs started taking place in the late 80’s,
and by then the table for hard negotiations had
been set. Presidential historian Michael Bechloss
recalled a particular time when Gorbachev had
been forced into a corner by Reagan during talks
at Reykjavik. Reagan had made a proposal and the
communist leader made a counter: “This all
depends, of course, on you giving up SDI” (41).
Reagan flat-out refused, promptly walked out and
flew back to the U.S. This hard line made
Gorbachev conclude that the Soviet bear could no
longer realistically compete with the soaring
American eagle. The U.S. and its enigmatic leader
were firmly in charge.
What of détente’s fate? The Soviets, under
the auspices of talking softly and sweetly with
Nixon, Ford, and Carter had by Reagan’s entrance,
built up a cache of nuclear armaments that had put
the U.S. in a risky position. In order to quell the
growing Communist force, a carefully-balanced
fight of tough talk and action was needed.
By the sixth year of Reagan’s presidency,
Europe and America were at peace. Liberal
foreign policy ideology had taken firm root; and
the great Communicator had effectually halted the
advance of the Soviet machine, even making it
reverse its tracking. Reagan led through what
many historians refer to as a ‘peace through
strength’ campaign. He was able to awaken the

policy of containment and nuclear deterrence
ignored by the fellow leaders of the détente
movement (Meyerson 66-67).
On June 12, 1987, the aging president took
Gorbachev once more to task by the use of
powerful rhetoric. Standing outside the
Brandenburg Gate in West Germany, and before
an audience of millions, Reagan implored the
Soviet leader into a call for decisive action. He
asked Gorbachev, that if he was for peace, liberty,
and prosperity to come to the gate, open it and to
tear down the Berlin Wall— the literal dividing
place of western freedom and eastern
imprisonment, and long a symbol of Cold War
ideology that began in the days of Khrushchev and
Kennedy some three decades earlier. What was
Gorbachev to do now? All eyes were on him.
In the last year of his lame-duck
presidency, Reagan had one more decisive card to
play. In May 1988, he and his wife (First Lady
Nancy Reagan) took a trip to the Soviet Union.
With the INF treaty in place, now it was time for
the president to negotiate a lasting peace and see
that Gorbachev indeed would tear the wall down.
During a speech at Moscow University the
commander-in-chief told gathered students and
dignitaries that they were participants in a new,
exciting era of history. He spoke of the freedoms
that most take for granted, and experts have
concluded that it was probably the first time most
of the students had ever been exposed to the idea
of liberty. He implored them to accept the gift of
liberty that America was willing to share with the
rest of the world. Those students in that university
hall, Reagan said, were a “generation living in one
of the most exciting, hopeful times in Soviet
history. It is a time when the first breath of
freedom stirs the air and the heart beats to the
accelerated rhythm of hope, when the accumulated
spiritual energies of a long silence yearn to break
free” (Lefcowitz’s “Great Communicator”).
In an often-quoted part of the presentation
the president referred to a Russian song that
poignantly drove his point home. He made
reference to the line that asks a simple question:
‘Go ask my mother, go ask my wife; then you will
have to ask no more, Do the Russians want a war?’
His aim was to pull at the heart strings of the new
generation of potential Russian leaders. He
recalled the days of joint exploration between the
two countries and said that it would please him
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best if he would be able to see in his lifetime a free
Russia engaged in and grappling with the issues of
democracy (Lefcowitz’s “Great Communicator”).
Reagan, who died in 2004, would see the
fruits of his labor. After he was termed out of
office, he would live to see his predecessor George
H.W. Bush sign more treaties and accords with
Gorbachev and the later Russian leader Boris
Yeltsin. The Berlin Wall indeed did fall in October
1989. The two Germanys —both East and West—
united and became one. In 1990, former Warsaw
Pact countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, and Romania would fight fervently to
bury Communism and embrace a more open and
democratic way of living. Even in other parts of
the globe a dramatic domino-effect of change was
taking place. Nelson Mandela, who had been
imprisoned for nearly 30 years by the South
African apartheid regime, was suddenly freed.
Finally, in 1991, the Soviet Union would be no
more.
In his presidential papers in May of 1986,
Reagan wrote that it was his wish to attain peace,
but not at the cost of giving up democracy: “In
sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost
restraint… in order to foster the necessary
atmosphere for significant reductions in the
strategic arsenals of both sides. I call on the Soviet
Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in
establishing an interim framework of truly mutual
restraint… if the Soviet Union carries out this
agreement, we can move now to achieve greater
stability and a safer world”(681).
With the rest of the world watching,
Gorbachev couldn’t call Reagan’s bluff. The
future of those students in that room, their
families —and the rest of the globe, for that
matter, rested on Gorbachev and his leadership.
The Russians had no choice left but to say yes to
the call of liberty, democracy, and capitalistic
endeavors; and to seize an opportunity that would
put the world on a road to lasting peace— as far
as a nuclear holocaust was concerned, at least.
Détente had ruled the day for most of the Cold
War— a conflict of one-upmanship, war games,
espionage, treason, and muted diplomacy.
With the world, led by the two
superpowers, locked in a struggle between liberty
and freedom; and stunted by oppression and
suppression, it took a strong, decisive, confident
figure like Reagan to step in and play a style of

hard-ball tactics for the world to stand still and
take notice. In Reagan’s mind, there were two
choices: to fight for world freedom and stay true
to the tenets of democracy; or god forbid, head
down a road of in his words, an ‘Armageddon’,
and suffer a worldwide destruction by an
unforgiving -- and heartless-- nuclear weaponry.
He was not going to back down even if it meant
world annihilation.
It is safe to say, however, that Reagan, a
man both of immense compassion and distancing
coldness, indeed most probably had a fear of what
would come had his bluff been called. He would
often describe America as a ‘shining city upon a
hill’; and in his mind, he knew if he was to save
his precious city from burning down and indeed
the world from an earth-wide nuclear meltdown,
it was not going to be for a lack of trying. It was
his
bluffing tactics
of
steel
nerve,
uncompromising talk, and a firm resolve that
assisted his step forward to meet a foreboding
Russian challenge head on and usher in a lasting
and meaningful peace for the world.
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